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Concepts and Mechanics of Evaluating Infrastructure Public-Private Partnerships 
A discussion of key practical issues, illustrated through a case example 
 
By Vivek Sakhrani* and Richard de Neufville† 
 
Introduction 
This text presents and illustrates crucially important concepts about how to perform a 
proper economic evaluation of an infrastructure public-private partnership (PPP) and appreciate 
the contractual value implications for the partners. The discussion speaks to managers, policy-
makers, and all those concerned with the development of infrastructure projects. It focuses on 
identifying and presenting important economic issues that decision-makers need to recognize 
and resolve. 
This piece centers on a practice-oriented economic appraisal of infrastructure projects. 
The approach used is widely applicable, consistent with theoretical guidelines, and fully in line 
with best practice. Specifically, it builds upon the use of “spreadsheets” that detail costs and 
revenues over time, and enable the calculation of discounted cash flows. This procedure has by 
now become the standard form of economic analysis in commerce and industry. It is easily 
implemented using commonly available software tools. 
The discussion pays special attention to the economic issues associated with contracts 
between public and private sector partners for infrastructure projects. Such arrangements are 
increasingly common worldwide for the development of major infrastructure projects. Examples 
include highways (in Chicago, Texas, Toronto, Europe, and India), airports worldwide, 
desalination plants in the Arab world and in China, electricity plants in India, and many more 
projects. Contracts can be powerful instruments in shaping both overall project value, and the 
benefits to the contracting parties. Spreadsheet analyses of the economics of public-private 
contracts usefully illuminate a range of the issues involved. 
The presentation starts with an overview of the concepts central to the evaluation of both 
general and PPP projects. It then presents the essential elements of the standard spreadsheet 
analysis of economic value.  It illustrates the analysis using a realistic case study of a 
hypothetical public-private partnership for developing and operating a major international airport. 
This case provides a useful vehicle for illustrating the important concepts and mechanics of 
evaluating public-private projects.‡ 
 
Concepts of Evaluating Public-Private Partnerships 
In brief, the conceptual points are that: 
• “Money now is more valuable than money in the future.” Conversely, income that 
may be received years from now should be “discounted” compared to money spent now. 
Economic theory calls this the time preference. Proper project evaluation uses the 	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MA, 02139, U.S.A. 
† Professor of Engineering Systems and of Civil and Environmental Engineering, MIT, Cambridge, MA, 
02139, U.S.A. 
‡ The recent renovation of the Delhi International Airport provided both the inspiration for the case study 
and many of its details.  However, the case study is not an exact account of that project. Even so, it 
illustrates general issues and possibilities associated with such a large-scale, long-term development.   
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discount rate to adjust for future benefits and costs to a common reference point in time, 
nominally the “present”. 
• “The future is uncertain.” Whereas today’s costs are relatively well known as we pay 
them, future revenues cannot be known accurately. A common saying is that “the 
forecast is always wrong.” This is to say that a wide range of market, political, and 
technological changes make actual future revenues and costs deviate from original 
estimates. In fact, future revenues or benefits from a project normally depend closely on 
the overall economic and political situation of its location. This situational dependence, 
i.e. “state of the world” over and above the effects of time defines project risk, and the 
evaluation needs to reflect how risk affects project value.  
• “Risk increases the discount of the future.” Investors naturally prefer safety. They 
tend to avoid risky investments. On the other hand, they may be willing to invest if they 
expect to be properly compensated for assuming the chance of losses. The greater the 
risk, the higher the compensation they require. This leads to a fundamental economic 
truth: risky projects are inseparable from high discount rates. This also works in reverse: 
projects with less risk benefit from lower discount rates. The value of any project thus 
depends on its risk. Consequently, a proper project evaluation must allow for different 
perceptions of risk through the easy ability to modify the discount rate. 
•  “Projects can be economic failures, or great successes.”  It is impossible to know 
exactly what will occur. The effects of time and risk drive a wide range of possible future 
outcomes. Managers and policy-makers need to recognize these possibilities.  
Specifically, they need to develop policies to deal with the possibility of both commercial 
failure and extravagant private profits. 
• “Flexibility in project development adds value.” The ability to adjust the pattern and 
timing of development increases the expected value of a project. Flexibility to adjust 
some project decisions to circumstances can reduce the risks to the public and private 
partners, and thus their perceived costs, so as to increase the overall project value. 
Flexibility also enables owners and managers to modify the project to take advantage of 
new opportunities.   
•  “Contracts allocate the risk between public authorities and private investors.”  
Contracts do more than divide costs, revenues, or profits between the public and the 
private participants. They also set up incentives that guide the participant’s decisions, 
which may affect what profits are available to the project. In so doing, contracts also 
allocate the risks and the long-term viability of the project. 
• “A balanced share of risks and profits is desirable.”  Excessive private profits are 
likely to be politically intolerable; in the past they have led to governmental takeovers 
and major disruptions (as for the Dabhol power plant in Maharashtra). Conversely, it is 
not good for the public if the private investors go bankrupt and quit the project. Overall, it 
is desirable for a public-private arrangement to maintain some balance of benefits. This 
balance could either be pre-specified or negotiated. For example, the contract may 
anticipate changes in the responsibilities and allocation of revenues and costs according 
to pre-set terms that appropriately protect both the public and private participants. On 
the other hand, the contract may enable reconvening stakeholders periodically as project 
performance evolves over time. 
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Mechanics of Project Evaluation 
The mechanics of project evaluation translate the above concepts into an analysis that 
can be systematically applied to almost any project. A “spreadsheet” is the basic tool used 
worldwide for this purpose. This section explains the essentials of using a spreadsheet to 
evaluate projects and provides the basis for the case study that demonstrates crucial important 
concepts of project evaluation. 
A spreadsheet is highly versatile. It can represent the wide range of possible current and 
future revenues, costs, and profits associated with a project. The costs include the up-front 
investments, the continuing operating expenses, and the future capital investments needed to 
refurbish or expand the project. The revenues include the various fees, revenues and other 
forms of income that accrue to the project.  
Some of these data are inputs – the spreadsheet needs these as parameters in the 
same way that a calculator needs specific numbers before it can perform a mathematical 
operation. Other data are calculations using pre-specified formulas and relationships input by 
the user. The spreadsheet thus encodes the explicit structure for taking input data and 
converting them into outputs that are meaningful to the analyst or decision-maker.  
The general structure of a spreadsheet for the economic evaluation of a project is a table 
that runs from left to right, successively showing the situation period-by-period, typically in 
years. The left-most vertical column identifies the major structural elements of the project, such 
as the: 
• state of the system (its size, for example), 
• discount rate, 
• project life (or duration of the concession contract), 
• associated unit revenues for service provided, 
• periodic investments and continuous operating expenses, 
• net revenues (or costs) in each period – this is known as the “cash flow”, and 
• discounted value of these cash flows of revenues and costs. 
Conventionally, the calculated overall value of the project appears prominently in the lower left 
hand side of the spreadsheet. This value usually is the “Net Present Value” or NPV.§  It is ‘net’ in 
that it presents the economic value net of the various costs.  It is ‘present’ in that it reflects the 
current value of cash flows discounted for time and risk as of the period at the start of the 
analysis. Table 1 illustrates the typical arrangement of a spreadsheet, with annotations 
corresponding to the steps and sections introduced below. 
The spreadsheet “analysis” properly consists of four steps:   
1. Identification of the amounts of costs and revenues at any time.  The spreadsheet clearly 
displays input data such as unit costs or unit revenues and project total costs and 
revenues over time. The analyst provides best estimates of these data, derived from 
information about the project’s structural features such as its size, and its mode of 
operation. This explicit presentation of the details is a great advantage: it makes the 
analysis transparent. It enables policy-makers and managers to identify where they differ 
in assumptions about the data, and consequently to explore the implications alternative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
§ Alternatively, the overall value can be given as the “internal rate of return” or IRR. This represents a 
measure of the overall rate of return of the project.  In general terms, the IRR is a translation of the NPV.  
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project structures and project costs and revenues over time.  Refer to steps 3 and 4 
below for these sensitivity and simulation analyses. 
2. Calculation of the project value for any specific identification of costs and benefits.  From 
the analytic point of view, this is easy. Modern, commercially available spreadsheets 
include standard calculator functions that consider all the specified information and 
unambiguously and accurately calculate project value.** Any controversy about the result 
stems from differing views about the inputs, for example of the level of the discount rate. 
This type of analysis is static and deterministic, because the analyst fixes the assumed 
values for the sake of analysis. 
3. Sensitivity analysis. A great advantage of spreadsheets is that they allow the analyst to 
investigate the effect on project value of different assumptions about the input. They can 
almost instantaneously provide answers to such questions as: How would project value 
change if we assumed a different discount rate?  How would a 10% difference in future 
revenues affect project value?  This capability enables managers and policy-makers to 
appreciate the degree to which project value depends on different assumptions. 
4. Exploration of the value of possible combinations of future costs and benefits. As we do 
not know the future, a good analysis extends the sensitivity analysis to consider the 
many possible combinations of what may happen in the future. The easy way to do this 
is to use a “Monte Carlo simulation”.  This is an automated procedure that systematically 
combines the different possible future costs and benefits, and calculates the value of 
each possible outcome. It is equivalent to performing many sensitivity analyses 
simultaneously. It uses computational power to generate thousands of possibilities and 
their outcomes. As an example, while the spreadsheet calculations in the case study 
described below took a few hours to set up, the actual simulation runs 2000 iterations in 
a fraction of a second. Monte Carlo simulation enables analysts to present the range and 
distribution of the possible project values.  
 
Spreadsheet for the case study 
The case study concerns the development of a hypothetical major international airport. The 
recent renovation of Delhi International Airport is the source for some of the major assumptions, 
but our analysis does not pretend to replicate the exact details of that situation. It is definitely not 
a forensic analysis. The example’s estimates of possible future costs and benefits are 
reasonable but do not pretend to predict exactly what will occur – this is an impossible task for 
anyone. The case study does not provide an exact statement of what will or should occur. It 
simply provides a basis for illustrating major concepts of project evaluation by using a project 
that is familiar to a broad audience.   
The spreadsheet in Table 2 assembles the data used in the evaluation of the entire 
project. Following the 30-year public-private concession agreement to renovate the Delhi 
International Airport, the spreadsheet starts in 2006 and runs through to 2036.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
** Excel® is an example of such spreadsheet software. CrystalBall® and @Risk® are examples of 
software that conveniently enable Monte Carlo simulation on spreadsheets.  
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Table 1. Standard spreadsheet format for project evaluation 
 
 
 
As to costs, the initial private investments in the project were approximately INR13,000 
crores,†† inclusive of airport development capital and lease costs for land. For simplicity, the 
spreadsheet allocates these costs over the initial three-year construction period (2006 – 2009). 
The analysis assumes that annual operating expenses increase from 2% to 5% of total capital 
cost over the construction period and thereafter stay constant at 5%.  According to the original 
plans, the spreadsheet reflects the idea that the airport’s capacity for aircraft movements 
(landings and takeoffs) grows every 10 years due to efficiencies gained in airport operations, 
scheduling and infrastructure maintenance and upgrades. Specifically, capacity for movements 
is 400,000 until 2016, grows by 20% to 480,000 movements from 2016 to 2026, and by another 
20% to 576,000 from then until 2036, the end of the concession period. Passenger traffic is 
correlated with movements; the number of passengers increases proportionally with movements 
over time. 
The airport derives revenues from aeronautical and non-aeronautical sources. The 
aeronautical sources are associated with the aircraft movements. The non-aeronautical sources 
are associated with the number of passengers, as through sales and fees, and with other 
activities at the airport, such as hotels, conventions, offices, and other commercial activities. 
The airport continues to generate some revenues during the initial investment period (2006-
2009), but only ramps up operations after 2009. The Technical Appendix gives details on the 
forecasts of aircraft movements, of passenger traffic, and thus of the projected airport revenues. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
†† 1 crore = 10 million. At the rate of US$ 1 = INR50, the cost of the renovation was about US$ 2.6 billion. 
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Presentation of Evaluation Concepts 
 
“Money now is more valuable than money in the future.” 
An obvious demonstration of this fact is that the price of goods becomes more expensive 
over time. This is the phenomenon of inflation. Since our hypothetical project is located in India, 
we illustrate this using data from the India. According to the Labour Bureau of the Government 
of India, the Consumer Price Index for Industrial Workers in India went from 100 in 2001 to 239 
by the end of 2013 (http://labourbureau.nic.in/indnum.htm). This represents an average increase 
of about 9% each year.  Put alternatively, in 2013 it took INR239 to get the same value as 
INR100 12 years earlier. 
This fact has an important consequence for any discussion of public-private agreements. 
This is that it is unfair to compare initial investment and eventual return and assume that the 
difference represents a real gain. For example, consider the investor who spent INR100 in 2001 
and got INR200 in 2013. We might say he doubled his money and got a 100% return.  However, 
in the case where the comparable value of INR100 in 2013 is in fact INR239, the investor has 
actually lost INR39 (= 239 – 200), that is over 15% (39/239 in percent) of his value! 
The important concept here, as regards evaluation of projects, is that simple 
comparisons of money invested and money returned at different points in time are wrong-
headed. This is an important point, since popular press and discussion easily makes such 
erroneous comparisons.‡‡ 
Most importantly, money now is also more valuable than money in the future because it 
can be put to good use in the meantime. Money invested in government bonds or some 
business obtains a return.  This added value compounds year by year into a larger amount.  In 
reverse, this larger amount is equivalent to the smaller initial investment. That is, from the 
perspective of both economic theory and practical commerce, future costs and revenues should 
be “discounted” in order to compare money spent and received in different periods. 
In general, to create a fair comparison of costs and revenues that occur in different 
periods, the analysis needs to put them on the same basis.  The process of doing this is called a 
“discounted cash flow analysis”. Spreadsheet software includes the capability to do this analysis 
automatically. 
The key issue for the economic analysis is the choice of the level of the discount rate, 
the rate at which future cash flows are discounted to the present. Common practice in project 
evaluation assumes that the discount rate is the same over the entire life of the project. This is 
because we cannot predict the ever-changing risks and other factors. In the same vein, 
common practice estimates future costs and revenues in current prices, because estimates of 
future inflation are highly speculative. 
The spreadsheet analysis in Table 2 uses an annual discount rate of 9% net of inflation. 
This is a reasonable value for India as it reflects the average rate of interest on 10-year bonds of 
the Government of India. Normal commercial rates are higher as they must account for the risk 
of possible of losses whereas the debt of national governments if often assumed to be riskless.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‡‡ Note in this context that tax authorities often equate the gain between money invested and that 
returned many years later as a profit – which gives them something to tax.  Investors recognize this 
phenomenon and consequently further discount future revenues, to compensate for this form of taxation. 
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As there are different points of view about what is the appropriate discount rate, it is important to 
explore the implications of using different rates. We demonstrate this with a sensitivity analysis 
that calculates project value for rates from 5% to 15% annually. 
 
“The Future is Uncertain.” 
 The spreadsheet numbers for the costs and revenues over the future of any project are 
always speculative. In the example spreadsheets, they represent extensions of the trends over 
a 10-year period.  This projection assumes that the immediate past will continue over the life of 
the concession. This is a reasonable approach -- but the outcome is actually unlikely! 
 As we can know from experience, things change, and can change quite rapidly. The 
experience with air transport in India demonstrates this phenomenon. New airlines have come 
into existence (Indigo, Spicejet) and failed (Kingfisher), and Indian (formerly Indian Airlines) has 
disappeared. Meanwhile travel patterns have changed, with more direct flights between outside 
the country and important regional airports such as Hyderabad and Chennai. These new routes 
bypass Delhi and to some degree cast into doubt previous traffic projections for Delhi. There 
has been considerable turmoil in the growth patterns. 
Figure 1 illustrates what may happen.  The blue line represents the projected number of 
aircraft movements entered in the spreadsheets, based on previous trends. This is the 
deterministic projection, as if we had already determined what would happen over time. The 
dotted red line in Figure 1 shows a single possible demand scenario – one of many possibilities 
-- overlaid on the deterministic projection. Note that both scenarios use actual observations and 
are identical from 2006 – 2013, after which the uncertain scenario diverges from the assumed 
exponential projection. The difference comes from how the analysis uses the historical data to 
create the forward-looking projection. The analysis generated the single possibility using the 
variability of the historic growth rates, as captured by the mean and volatility in historic growth 
rates. Using Monte Carlo simulation, it can generate many such demand scenarios and thus a 
probabilistic distribution showing the uncertainty of possible traffic over the life of the project. 
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Figure 1. Demand projection for deterministic model (solid blue line) and a single 
possible uncertain demand scenario in the simulation model (dotted red line) 
 
The important consequence of the observation that the future is uncertain is this:  No 
single evaluation can provide a complete understanding of the economic value of a project. The 
range of possible future costs and revenues combine to give a distribution of possible 
outcomes. In general, there will be some central tendency. However, extreme situations are 
also possible, and promoters of projects need to guard against them.  The complete economic 
evaluation of a project needs to examine the range of possible outcomes, in order to obtain a 
full understanding of its consequences. 
 
“Risk increases the discount of the future.” 
 The perceived economic value of a project depends on the discount rate used in the 
analysis. A general rule in this regard is: “the higher the discount rate, the lower the perceived 
project value.”  The reason is that higher discount rates reduce the present value of future cash 
flows, which principally are the benefits of the projects. In short, higher discount rates have little 
effect on the present value of immediate investments but reduce the present value of eventual 
benefits, thus decreasing overall project value.  
 Figure 2 illustrates this point. It reflects a sensitivity analysis of project value to discount 
rate, i.e. using identical costs and revenues and changing only the discount rate. It shows that 
the perceived value of the project ranges from over INR7,000 crores at a discount rate of 5%, to 
a negative value of over INR5,700 crores at a discount rate of 15%. 
 Figure 3 extends the sensitivity analysis in Figure 2, adding the possible variation of 
operating expenses, from 5% a year up to 7% and down to 2%. 
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Figure 2. Sensitivity of project value to discount rates with annual operating expense 
assumed at 5% of total capital	  
 
 
Figure 3. Sensitivity of project value to discount rate and to variations of annual 
operating expense (2% to 7 % of capital) 
 
 The level of risk strongly influences the choice of discount rate. The higher the risk, the 
greater is the discount rate.  The safest projects and the most reliable borrowers benefit from 
the lowest rates; more risky projects have to pay higher rates to attract investment. 
Governments generally are more reliable than commercial enterprises, and thus benefit from 
lower rates. As a reference point, the interest rate for the Government of India for its 10-year 
bonds has averaged over 9% over recent decades.§§ 
 This concept has an important implication for project sponsors: they can significantly 
increase project value by reducing the perceived level of risk to the investors.  In practical terms 
for public-private partnerships, this means that if the public sector insists on the most risky 
contracts for the private participants, they are likely to have to pay more to attract their 
investment, and thus to reduce the value of the project. In short, government sponsors should – 
in their own and the public interest -- consider ways to reduce the risks to the investors. The 
section on risk allocation between public and private partners revisits this point. 
 
“Projects can be economic failures, or great successes.”   
 A spreadsheet analysis of any project using a specific forecast of future costs and 
revenues, and a chosen discount rate, delivers a single estimate of project Net Present Value. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
§§ Between 1994 and 2013, the market yield on 10-year bonds of the Government of India reportedly 
averaged over 9% and ranged from a high of over 14% in 1996, to a low of about 5% in 2003. 
(http://www.tradingeconomics.com/india/government-bond-yield)  
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However, this single value does not give a full description of the potential value of the project.  
This because of the inevitable uncertainty associated with any forecasts. 
 Uncertainty in project values more likely depends on uncertainty in revenues.  The 
reason is that initial investment costs, being more immediate and controllable, may be less 
uncertain than estimates of future traffic and revenues decades into the future.  This means that 
projects can face enormous uncertainties about their eventual economic success or failure. 
 It is worth noting in this context that project managers may have limited influence on 
future demands for their products, the prices they can obtain, and thus their future revenues. An 
airport company or authority only has a limited influence on airport traffic that depends on 
international and regional economies, the price of jet fuel and airfares, as well as political 
uncertainties. Forecasts of airport traffic have been routinely wrong by plus or minus 20% over 
just a decade.*** Similarly for desalination plants and other waterworks: their economic value 
rests on the long-term demand for water that depends on the size of the population, the intensity 
of their use of water, and the prices that are allowed. Likewise for highways: some seem full the 
moment they are opened, others may not generate predicted levels of traffic. Thus the traffic on 
US$1.4 billion Texas Highway 130 has been 50% less than predicted. On the other hand, the 
Delhi-Chandigarh highway seems full on completion. The level of future traffic and revenue is a 
project risk largely beyond management control. 
 A proper project evaluation needs to consider the range and distribution of possible 
outcomes.  Consider the evaluation for the airport project displayed in Figure 3. Using the trend 
extrapolations of traffic and revenues, annual operating expenses at 5% of capital, and a 9% 
discount rate, the overall project value is negative INR948 crores – apparently not attractive. 
With the same discount rate and annual operating expenses at 2% of capital, project value 
seems to become positive at INR2,711 crores. But such estimates do not present the final word; 
the analysis needs to consider the range of circumstances.   
By using Monte Carlo simulation to generate the distribution of possible assumptions, 
and inputting these scenarios into the spreadsheet, the analysis develops an estimate of the 
range of possible outcomes. Focusing on the distribution of possibilities for traffic demand, and 
using a 9% discount rate and annual operating expenses at 5% of capital, we obtained project 
values ranging from a maximum gain of INR475 crores to a loss of INR1,420 crores.  
One way to represent the detailed distribution of results is a histogram as on the left in 
Figure 4.  This shows that the extreme values have low probabilities of occurrence, and the mid-
range values are most likely (as is usually the case).  Alternatively, we can display these results 
using a Target Curve (also known as a cumulative probability distribution) as on the right in 
Figure 4. Target curves have several advantages.  An immediate one is that they enable us to 
identify the Value at Risk (VAR), which is the probability of not meeting some desired threshold. 
For example, Figure 4 shows that, when using a discount rate of 9%, there is about a 70% 
chance that the airport project would have an NPV less than zero, that is, that the project would 
be undesirable economically. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
*** For details, see “Airport Systems Planning, Design, and Management,” second edition, by Richard de 
Neufville and Amedeo Odoni, McGraw-Hill, 2013. 
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Figure 4.  Distribution (histogram; left) and cumulative distribution (target curve; right) of 
possible project values evaluated using 9% discount rate 
 
The overall conceptual point is that any project can easily be either economically 
successful or not. In short, projects are risky. This reality significantly affects the projects, most 
significantly because greater risk increases the cost of money. 
 
“Flexibility in project development adds value.” 
 Following from the preceding, properly incorporating flexibility can benefit all concerned.  
It can simultaneously lower risk to the private investment, which reduces overall costs, and 
protect the public from excessive private gains. The UK contract for the Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI) construction of the Dartmouth Crossing of the Thames East of London provides a 
good example of this. The agreement allowed the UK Government to cancel its 20-year 
concession to a private company, only once revenues had reached a predefined threshold 
acceptable to the private developer. This threshold essentially covered overall investment and 
operational costs, plus an allowance for the management efforts. 
 Embedding flexibility in the project early on in the definitional phase can later allow both 
the public and private partners to adjust the project to future realities, such as the demand for 
services. The issue is that a fixed specification for a project may require the private operator to 
create facilities for which there is no real need, or to limit construction to a design that eventually 
proves to be insufficient. For example, the PPP contract between the Government of Portugal 
and Brisa (a highway company) specified that Brisa would build Motorway A1 with two lanes in 
each direction.  Since Brisa correspondingly did not build in the capacity to widen the highway to 
three lanes in each direction, this expansion was enormously costly to Portugal when events 
determined this capacity was needed. In general, properly designed opportunities to change the 
design of a project can be valuable. 
 To illustrate this in the context of our airport project, consider the possibility of very high 
traffic demand in the second half of the concession period (2021 – 2036).  In high demand 
scenarios, the prevailing airport capacity (either in terms of movements or passengers) may be 
insufficient to meet demand, even after accounting for any efficiency improvements in airport 
operations by that time. It is also quite likely that adding a new runway and refurbishing 
terminals may be more cost effective than building a new greenfield airport. However the 
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decision to use the flexibility to add a new runway depends on the level of demand that is 
observed at the end of the first half of the concession period. The airport company should 
expand the airport only if demand is sufficiently high, and the new expanded project is more 
valuable than the current design. To understand whether this future ability is valuable and 
should be embedded in the contract, the contracting partners have to evaluate the possible 
value of flexibility upfront, i.e. at the time of developing the airport. 
 In the spreadsheet analysis, the value of being able to expand the airport in the future is 
studied using a Monte Carlo simulation, as described above and shown in Figure 4. The key 
difference for the flexibility analysis is that the simulation spreadsheet now contains an 
automated process for expansion in the form of a “decision rule”. The rule takes the following 
form: “if traffic demand exceeds capacity in any year during the period 2021 – 2030, then 
increase capacity by 20% with a new runway, otherwise operate as usual”. Thus capacity is 
added only in those scenarios in the simulation in which demand exceeds capacity in a certain 
time window. Note that the actual additional capacity increase lags the decision time by the 
amount of taken for construction, assumed as three years, and the new runway is assumed to 
cost about 10% of the original fixed costs (~ INR1,300 crores) of developing the airport. 
 The histogram on the left in Figure 5 compares the distribution of project value for the 
airport project with the ability to expand (“with expansion”), with the original inflexible design (“no 
expansion”) evaluated in Figure 4. The target curves for the two options are also compared in 
Figure 5. It can be seen from this histogram that more of the area of the distribution for the 
expansion option lies in the positive region; the distribution is shifted to the right. This implies 
that higher positive project values are more likely, and also that project value is higher on 
average, as given by the new range of negative INR1,500 crores to INR1,900 crores. The target 
curve comparison suggests that there is now only a 30% chance that the project NPV falls 
below 0, instead of the 70% chance for the inflexible design. This flexibility would significantly 
reduce the risk to both the public partner as well as the airport company. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Distribution (histogram; left) and cumulative distribution (target curve; right) of 
possible project values with and without airport expansion (flexibility) evaluated using 
9% discount rate    
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 The main conceptual point here is that it is better to anticipate that project participants 
could mutually benefit from important changes at later stages in the life of the project. By 
evaluating how remaining flexible can add value, the parties in the partnership have a better 
understanding of the rationale for embedding flexibility in the project contract. 
 
“Contracts allocate the risk between public authorities and private investors.”   
 Contracts between participants most importantly define how they will share costs and 
revenues. This means that contracts allocate the risks associated with the project. Thus the 
contracts influence the overall project value. The practical implication is that an overall 
evaluation of a public-private partnership should consider how the contract between the public 
and private partners allocates the costs and revenues. 
Table 3 presents the economics of the example airport project from the point of view of 
the two principal contracting parties. These are the public participant, the Airports Authority of 
India (AAI), and the private airport company (modeled on Delhi International Airport Limited - 
DIAL). The table summarizes the NPV shares for AAI and the airport company for different 
conditions, based on the flows of revenues and costs that accrue to each participant. The green 
areas indicate positive value, and the red areas show negative NPVs, that is, losses. 
The top half of Table 3 indicates the value for AAI, the public partner. Using a red box, 
the table highlights the stipulation that, as in the actual case of the concession agreement with 
DIAL, the AAI gets 46% of the project’s gross revenues without investing additional money. The 
bottom half of Table 3 shows the complementary view of the airport company, that is that they 
invest the INR13,000 crores cost of the initial renovation works and only get 54% of the gross 
revenues. The other rows in both the top and bottom halves also show the possible results if the 
AAI were to get shares of the gross revenues less than or beyond the 46% specified in the 
concession agreement, ranging from 30% - 50%. The columns indicate how the associated 
present values vary according to different discount rates for both the AAI and the airport 
company. The range of annual discount rates evaluated is 5% – 15%.  
The bottom line of Table 3 shows the sum of the NPV shares of the AAI and the airport 
company for the case study. This sum equals the total value of the project for the specified 
discount rate, as in Figure 2. Note that the gross revenue share to AAI never affects the total 
project value, only how this total value is distributed between the contracting parties. 
 The analysis indicates that the project agreement represented in the case study is 
always beneficial to AAI and the government, for all the conditions examined. However, the 
project looks extremely risky from the perspective of the private investors. Except in the most 
favorable circumstances, and unless they manage to find other sources of revenue that are not 
included in the spreadsheet, the airport company runs the risk losing money (and potentially 
going bankrupt).  
The different exposures arise because under the existing contract AAI obtains some 
fraction of revenue, but does not incur capital or operating expenses, whereas the airport 
company certainly incurs great costs in the course of airport development and operation over 
the concession period – but can only offset them with uncertain future revenues. The existing 
contract structure thus makes the example airport project very risky for the investors.  Such a 
situation normally raises the discount rate that investors would apply when evaluating the 
project, which in turn makes the project even more risky. 
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Table 3. Shares of Project Value (NPV – INR crores) to AAI and Airport Company as a 
function of AAI Revenue Share and Discount Rate 
 
	   	  
 
8,290INR    5% 7% 9% 11% 13% 15%
30% 9,204 7,110 5,663 4,638 3,894 3,341
31% 9,485 7,322 5,827 4,768 4,000 3,428
32% 9,767 7,534 5,992 4,899 4,105 3,516
33% 10,049 7,747 6,156 5,029 4,211 3,603
34% 10,331 7,959 6,320 5,159 4,316 3,690
35% 10,613 8,171 6,484 5,289 4,422 3,778
36% 10,894 8,383 6,648 5,419 4,527 3,865
37% 11,176 8,596 6,813 5,550 4,633 3,952
38% 11,458 8,808 6,977 5,680 4,739 4,040
39% 11,740 9,020 7,141 5,810 4,844 4,127
40% 12,022 9,232 7,305 5,940 4,950 4,214
41% 12,303 9,444 7,469 6,070 5,055 4,302
42% 12,585 9,657 7,633 6,201 5,161 4,389
43% 12,867 9,869 7,798 6,331 5,266 4,476
44% 13,149 10,081 7,962 6,461 5,372 4,563
45% 13,431 10,293 8,126 6,591 5,478 4,651
46% 13,712 10,505 8,290 6,721 5,583 4,738
47% 13,994 10,718 8,454 6,852 5,689 4,825
48% 14,276 10,930 8,619 6,982 5,794 4,913
49% 14,558 11,142 8,783 7,112 5,900 5,000
50% 14,839 11,354 8,947 7,242 6,005 5,087
(9,238)INR   5% 7% 9% 11% 13% 15%
30% (2,096) (4,834) (6,611) (7,775) (8,542) (9,045)
31% (2,378) (5,046) (6,775) (7,906) (8,647) (9,132)
32% (2,660) (5,258) (6,939) (8,036) (8,753) (9,220)
33% (2,941) (5,470) (7,103) (8,166) (8,858) (9,307)
34% (3,223) (5,682) (7,268) (8,296) (8,964) (9,394)
35% (3,505) (5,895) (7,432) (8,426) (9,070) (9,482)
36% (3,787) (6,107) (7,596) (8,557) (9,175) (9,569)
37% (4,068) (6,319) (7,760) (8,687) (9,281) (9,656)
38% (4,350) (6,531) (7,924) (8,817) (9,386) (9,744)
39% (4,632) (6,743) (8,088) (8,947) (9,492) (9,831)
40% (4,914) (6,956) (8,253) (9,077) (9,597) (9,918)
41% (5,196) (7,168) (8,417) (9,208) (9,703) (10,006)
42% (5,477) (7,380) (8,581) (9,338) (9,809) (10,093)
43% (5,759) (7,592) (8,745) (9,468) (9,914) (10,180)
44% (6,041) (7,805) (8,909) (9,598) (10,020) (10,268)
45% (6,323) (8,017) (9,074) (9,728) (10,125) (10,355)
46% (6,605) (8,229) (9,238) (9,859) (10,231) (10,442)
47% (6,886) (8,441) (9,402) (9,989) (10,336) (10,529)
48% (7,168) (8,653) (9,566) (10,119) (10,442) (10,617)
49% (7,450) (8,866) (9,730) (10,249) (10,548) (10,704)
50% (7,732) (9,078) (9,894) (10,379) (10,653) (10,791)
5% 7% 9% 11% 13% 15%
7,108 2,276 (948) (3,137) (4,648) (5,704)
NPV Share for Airport Company as a function of AAI Revenue Share and Discount Rate
NPV Share for AAI as a function of AAI Revenue Share and Discount Rate
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A different contract structure, for example one in which the AAI reduced its share of 
gross revenues in exchange for a substantial share of the profits, would reduce the risk to the 
airport company, thus lower the overall cost of capital and discount rate, while maintaining or 
even increasing the overall returns to the private sector AAI. 
The practical implication of the concept that contracts are an important factor in project 
evaluation, is that sponsors should carefully consider how the structure of the contract. They 
need to consider how it creates risks for the participants, which may lower the overall economic 
success of the project. 
 
“A balanced share of risks and profits is desirable.”   
An unbalanced allocation of risks and profits can have bad consequences for a public-
private partnership. Sponsors of public-private partnerships should avoid such situations.  
If, as the preceding analysis seems to suggest for the example airport project, a contract 
is too disadvantageous to the private partner, then the private company may become bankrupt 
and cease operations. Such an event would force the public sector to assume responsibilities it 
may not be prepared to accept. Even short of this eventuality, if the airport company is losing 
money, it will reduce services and repairs, and forego needed investments to upgrade capacity. 
Such was the experience of Argentina with its Italian private developers of its national airports.  
However one looks at the situation, driving the private operator out of business causes 
operational and political problems. 
At the other extreme, public-private agreements that lead to extraordinary profits are 
likely to be politically intolerable. Such situations lead to extensive, expensive arguments of all 
sorts.  The case of the Dabhol power plant is a prime example of such a situation. Whatever the 
merits of the argument with Enron, having a major power plant idle for years when Maharashtra 
had power shortages was not desirable. 
The point we need to retain is that the public-private contract should ensure some kind 
of balance in the allocation of risks and profits.  Extreme imbalances easily degrade the value of 
the overall project.  A proper economic evaluation of a project should take this phenomenon into 
account. 
 
OVERALL CONCLUSIONS 
This piece presents important concepts about how to perform a proper economic 
evaluation of an infrastructure public-private partnership (PPP), including the assessment of 
contractual value implications for the partners. The discussion speaks to managers, policy-
makers, and all those concerned with the development of infrastructure projects.  
The text first introduces the conceptual ideas that are central to the evaluation of 
infrastructure PPPs. It then provides an overview of the mechanics of using a spreadsheet, the 
standard approach for such economic evaluations. The discussion explores the main concepts 
by applying the spreadsheet analysis to the hypothetical case study of an international airport 
PPP project, modeled on the Delhi International Airport. The resulting analysis supports 
conceptual insights and highlights some important considerations both for the evaluation of 
infrastructure PPPs as well as implications for partners in the PPP contract.  
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In summary, the key concepts and highlights of the spreadsheet analysis are that: 
• “Money now is more valuable than money in the future.” The time value of 
money significantly affects value for projects. This is because of the relative timing of 
costs and revenues, and what future cash flows are worth at the present moment. 
Project evaluators can assess the effect of time on value by conducting a sensitivity 
analysis of discount rates. 
• “The future is uncertain.” There is a wide range of possibilities that can affect the 
future of a project, for example the demand for traffic. This uncertainty creates risk 
and affects project value. We unpack the implications of uncertainty by studying 
distributions of outcomes in the spreadsheet analysis, in addition to deterministic 
projections for factors such as traffic demand. 
• “Risk increases the discount of the future.” Investors tend to be risk-averse. If 
they perceive the project as risky, they will discount for uncertain outcomes occurring 
in the future, over and above the adjustment for time. A sensitivity analysis of 
discount rates over a wide range provides evaluators insights about the effect of risk 
on project value, without having to make a subjective judgment about the appropriate 
discount rate for the project. 
• “Projects can be economic failures, or great successes.” While a project may 
appear value positive (or value negative) on average, looking at the distributions of 
possible and likely outcomes gives a more complete picture. The spreadsheet 
analysis facilitates this with visual aids such as histograms and target curves that 
convey relevant information about the likelihood and magnitude of value outcomes. 
• “Flexibility in project development adds value.” Project partners can enhance 
project value if they anticipate that the project may need to change in the future in 
response to evolving needs. The analysis demonstrates this by studying the effect of 
the option to expand airport capacity. To capture the value that flexibility may provide 
however, the project contract must enable such flexible decision-making. 
• “Contracts allocate the risk between public authorities and private investors.” 
The terms of the contract specify how and when the parties will incur costs and earns 
revenues. The contract divides the total project value into shares for the parties in 
the agreement. Evaluating the structure of the contract helps project evaluators 
relate the value for each party to its risk exposure. In the analysis of the airport 
project, the gross revenue share was a key contractual variable determining risk and 
value outcomes for the PPP. 
• “A balanced share of risks and profits is desirable.” Sponsors and investors in 
infrastructure public-private partnerships will be well served by balancing their 
rewards in relation to their risk exposure. Neither excessive private gains nor losses 
are desirable, since both will eventually be detrimental to the public interest. A proper 
economic evaluation provides insights into the degree of balance between risk and 
rewards for the contracting parties.  
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Technical Appendix  
 
Airport revenues  
It is common practice to divide airport revenues into two streams: aeronautical and non-
aeronautical. Aeronautical revenues are those attributed directly to aircraft movements (takeoffs 
and landings). Non-aeronautical revenues are those associated with other activities at the 
airport, such as shopping, rental of office buildings, parking and other fees for airport activities.  
It is generally true that aeronautical revenues correlate well with the total number of 
aircraft movements, and that non-aeronautical revenues follow the total number of passengers. 
Figures A1 (a) & (b) illustrate this phenomenon for Delhi International Airport, using historical 
data over the decade from 2001 to 2013. In both cases the “R squared” correlation coefficient is 
over 90 percent, which is high. Notice that in this period the average values of these revenues 
were about 20,000 INR per movement and 250 INR per passenger, and are comparable with 
figures at major airports worldwide.  
One way to estimate future amounts of aeronautical and non-aeronautical revenues is to 
insert projected airport traffic into the formulas connecting traffic with revenues. 
 
Airport Traffic 
It is likewise possible to estimate future airport traffic by projecting the trends based on 
historical data. The trends at Delhi International Airport over the period from 2001 to 2013 
appear in Figures A2 (a) & (b). 
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Figure A1. (a) Aeronautical revenues as a function of aircraft movements, and (b) Non-
aeronautical revenues as a function of passenger traffic (2001 – 2013) 
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Figure A2. (a) Growth in aircraft movements, and (b) Growth in passenger traffic (2001 – 
2013) 
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